This paper is the first in a series which aims to provide insights into the use ofscenarios for informing low carbon energy policy. This first paper explores thebroader history of scenario building and highlights points of best practice.Subsequent papers in the series will review recent low carbon energy scenarios andmake suggestions for their development.Scenario thinking is a natural, indeed essential human activity. It is the basis of oureveryday ability to forward-plan, of more structured activities such as safety routinesand contingency plans, as well as of imaginative visions such as literary or politicalutopias. This paper proposes that scenario thinking is the use of the imagination toconsider possible alternative situations as they may evolve from the present, with aview to improving immediate and near-term decision making.The paper also proposes three possible kinds of objectives on which scenarioprocesses may be intended to deliver: Improving protective decision making- allowing us to be more robust to • possible future external environments Improving proactive decision making- allowing us to identify opportunities to • intervene upon and influence the external environment Consensus building- encouraging diverse actors to engage in moving towards • a common goalThe paper presents a 'family tree' to chart the evolution of various strategic scenarioplanning activities since the mid-1950s, which acknowledges that constructing stricttypologies of the scenario literature is problematic due to numerous 'cross overs'between 'schools'. The paper then reviews a selection of the more renowned scenarioprocesses which have taken place over the last half century.A comparison of the original Limits to Growth study of 1972, with scenario studiesproduced around the same time by the Hudson Institute, reveal contrasting viewsabout the prospects for humanity if it continued its current rate of growth andconsumption- on the one hand a dystopia, on the other a utopia. The differences canbe traced to contrasting assumptions which are the result of strongly held 'worldviews', relating to the extent to which technological progress can be assumed, andthe extent to which humanity is viewed as being collectively able to act presciently.It is noted that the poles of this debate have become strong and long-livedarchetypes which remain present in many later scenario studies. They are oftenrepresented as contrasting world views, although this can allow the assumptions onwhich they are based to go untested.
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